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Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the ‘Local’ Level: Historical Enquiries in Northern Ireland 
                                      
Abstract
‘Truth’ recovery has become part of a globalized ‘formula’ which transitional justice advocates claim is imperative to conflict transformation. Yet the value of ‘truth’ and efficacy of international ‘truth’ recovery templates has been negatively critiqued. Increasingly, ‘localised’ approaches to memory work are seeking to develop innovative and context specific processes to grapple with these potentially divisive and challenging issues. Through ‘local/global’ perspectives and ‘bottom-up’ critiques, this article explores how transitional justice discourse has been mediated, strategically adapted and ‘localized’. Using a case study of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) a police-led ‘truth’ recovery process distinctive to Northern Ireland, it examines the paradoxes of transitional justice and the challenges it can generate for states and societies in transition. In order to do this, the article examines the purpose of the HET as envisaged by its architects, its effectiveness as a ‘truth’ recovery mechanism and the intense debates it has generated. The aim of the article is to consider the controversial nature of dealing with the past and the inherent dilemmas and difficulties of memory work post-conflict. The complications of a police-led ‘truth’ recovery process in a divided society with a history of contested policing and the lessons for other societies in transition are discussed. 
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Introduction
When conflicts end there are often competing and conflicting memories about the violent events of the past. Jelin (2007:138-139) makes the point that memory struggles are always part and parcel of the demands for ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, and in turn, ‘are part of a larger arena of transitional politics that cannot be seen independently’. Increasingly, victims are looking for ways to press their claims for ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and accountability. This raises a range of problems and dilemmas for governments and societies in transition. The dilemma is whether, and if so, how, to address such a legacy. A vast literature has emerged on how best to deal with the past by adopting a variety of mechanisms. Much of the theory and policy formulation has been in the context of transitional justice ​[1]​  (Hayner, 2002; Kritz, 1995; Teitel, 2000). In particular, there are claims, counter claims and intense debates about whether truth commissions can deliver on their stated goals (see for example, Campbell and Turner, 2008; Daly, 2008; Mendlloff 2004; Thomas, Ron and Paris, 2008). Proponents claim that truth commissions, and other transitional justice measures, are beneficial as a means to consolidate peace and transition. Sceptics dispute these claims and query the value of memory and the purpose of ‘truth’ recovery. Others point to the lack of reliable data about the effects of transitional justice generally. 

The concepts of memory and ‘truth’ are highly contested (Berliner, 2005) and in the post-conflict struggle for memory there are likely to be multiple ‘truths’ (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2003). Jelin (2007:140) makes the point that ‘the existence of different interpretations of the past implies that at any time and place, it is unthinkable to find one memory, a single version and interpretation of the past shared by a whole society whatever its scope and size’.  Moreover, memories and ‘truths’ are frequently interpreted and re-interpreted through the often highly politicised lens of the present; memories are not neutral’ (Brewer, 2010:145). As Portelli (2006:37) notes, ‘memory is not a passive depository of facts, but an active creation of meaning’. In parallel with the ‘truth’ debate, there is a division in interpretation and claims of memory work. Some commentators have interpreted memory work ‘post-conflict’ as adversarial and inherently harmful and/or it is ‘war by other means’ (Whelan and Graham, 2007). Others see the potentially transformative role of memory work in divided societies (Brewer, 2010:142:154); or its politically mediating role ‘post-conflict’ (Brown 2007; Brown and Viggiani, 2010). Yet, despite recognition of memory’s ‘fragile value’ (Radstone, 2000:3) and differing interpretations of the role of memory and ‘truth’, there has been a remarkable ‘memory boom’ in the late twentieth century and a proliferation of truth commissions worldwide. The frequency with which truth commissions have been adopted, around 30 commissions spanning four continents, is testimony to their popularity (Campbell and Turner, 2008: 374). 

Given the tensions evoked by conflicting memories, efforts to find ways of dealing with the past pose significant challenges and dilemmas for states and societies in transition (Lundy, 2010). This may go some way to explaining why dealing with the past is the outstanding issue of Northern Ireland’s peace process. In contrast to other post-conflict societies it has not established a truth commission. To date it has been marked by, what could be interpreted as, a deliberate fragmented approach by the state that is not designed to address the past in a comprehensive and holistic way. On the other hand, this might be regarded by some as an earnest attempt to navigate the potentially divisive terrain of the past in ways that do not reproduce divisions in the new post-conflict arena. Whatever the interpretation of this policy, it has created a vacuum which is filled by almost daily media reports that drip feed toxic revelations about the atrocities of the past raising more questions than answers. Despite strong opposition to ‘truth’ recovery within sections of the community in Northern Ireland, the reality is, ‘truth’ recovery is taking place by means of a plethora of unofficial and official means. The response of the British government is that it has implemented a ‘package of measures’​[2]​ which are the necessary steps to adequately deal with conflict-related deaths. The HET is a key component of the ‘package’; it is a special unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), set up to re-examine all conflict related deaths that do not involve the police as perpetrators and to answer the unresolved questions of victims’ families’ (Lundy, 2009a). Northern Ireland and the HET project offer an interesting case study into how a European liberal democracy has approached dealing with the past and highlight the inevitable difficulties when the struggle around memories and meaning is at issue.   

The article is structured in three distinct parts. Part 1 situates the HET in the broader international context and explores the globalisation of transitional justice discourse. Along with transition justice discourse, ’bottom-up’ and ‘local/global’ perspectives provide the theoretical framework to analyse a case study of the HET.  It discusses the contention that transitional justice discourse can be used by ‘local’ elites for a variety of other purposes, to conceal, or serve very different (political) agendas. It takes cognizance of the fact that finding ways of dealing with the past is an enormous challenge; the reality is it is likely to be imperfect, contested and involves pragmatic choices and compromise. In Part 2, after a brief overview of the Northern Ireland ‘post-conflict’ context, the motivation and purpose of the HET as perceived by its framers is analysed. I endeavour to explain the rationale for the HET in terms of the interplay of internal challenges and dilemmas and external influences. Part 3 builds on this section and discusses victims experiences of the HET. 

A number of specific cases and outcomes are considered. A fundamental question addressed in this section is whether the HET has the capacity to hold the state, and non-state actors, to account and restore victims’ dignity through ‘truth’, ‘justice’ and acknowledgement. These are ‘basic’ transitional justice principles and claimed benefits of ‘truth’ recovery more generally. In many ways these principles, rightly or wrongly, set the standards and benchmarks that are internationally recognised and promoted. Thus, transitional justice is a useful framework to unpack and consider some of the challenges states in transition face when attempting to confront the past and the inherent dilemmas that are indicative of memory work in divided societies generally. In order to fully understand the factors impacting on HET outcomes, it is also necessary to consider the role of a well established NGO sector, or intermediaries. They play a critical role in translating global ideas and are determined to resist, challenge and push the boundaries of ‘truth’ recovery. The article draws upon over four years’ first-hand research and unfettered access to the HET. This included over two years of day-to-day observation, in-depth interviews and access to documentation. Interviews were also carried out with other stakeholders including victims’ families and NGOs; the research remains ongoing. 

Globalisation of Transitional Justice
The strategies used to come to terms with the past have taken a wide variety of forms, ranging from massive criminal prosecution on the one hand, to collective amnesia on the other. Bell (2009) points out, the term transitional justice only came to be used in the mid-1990s and the speed with which it has grown is striking. A vast literature has amassed, there are scores of international conferences and seminars organised annually to debate every conceivable aspect of the discourse and exchange ‘good practice’; there are teams of ‘expert’ consultants, technical advisors, networks of international NGOs, self-help ‘rule-of-law tools’, manuals and software packages, databases, university courses and summer schools and institutions dedicated to the study of transitional justice. Amounting to what is a global transitional justice industry. At the same time, there is trans-national co-operation and information exchange between the above mentioned actors and forces aided by new technologies and use of the internet. This ‘global civil society’ is important because it facilitates the dissemination of transitional justice discourse and practice from the global to the ‘local’ and creates opportunities to challenge the state ‘from above and below’ (Brysk, 2002:1-19). ‘Global civil society’ is however a hotly contested concept; commentators have noted a less progressive and ‘constraining side’ and question its emancipatory potential (Bartelson, 2006). Simultaneously, transitional justice has been enthusiastically adopted by policy makers and it is now part of the standard ‘package’ of ‘liberal’ peace-building measures and United Nations peace-building programmes (Lundy and McGovern, 2008a). This has led some to argue, that the theoretical bases of many transitional justice policies resonates strongly with or is embedded in ‘liberal’ peace-building strategies (Turner, 2008; Sriram, 2007).  


‘Local-Global’ Circuit of Transitional Justice 
Increasingly, transitional justice is situated within the critical study of contemporary global institutions, in this case the transitional justice industry (see, IJTJ, Special Issue, 2009). Theorists and practitioners of transitional justice are more aware than ever before that there cannot be a ‘formulaic’ top-down legalistic approach. This is reflected in an emerging ‘bottom-up’ perspective and multidisciplinary literature that advocates politically and culturally appropriate ‘localized’, ‘locally-owned’ and ‘bottom-up’ transitional justice processes (see for example, Arriaza,& Roht-Arriaza, 2008; Betts, 2005; Gready, 2005; Lundy, 2009b; Lundy & McGovern, 2008a; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008). Given the diversity of societies in transition it is perhaps self-evident that what works in one situation may not necessarily in another. Activists point out that transitional justice will achieve greater legitimacy and is more likely to be sustainable if adapted to local cultural contexts. However, as argued later, the term ‘local’ seems to be rarely applied unfavourably and there is a danger in over-romanticising the concept (Lundy, 2009b). Mazlish (2005:95) puts it more succinctly, ‘there is a myth of the virtuous local that causes us to overlook its attendant evils’. 

There is one further perspective relevant to this article that moves us beyond the stark and mutually exclusive binary oppositions of ‘local’ and global that tend to dominate transitional justice literature. As studies of globalisation make clear, global processes, resources and discourses are processed locally, with these local mediations returning back, so that globalization itself is reproduced and disseminated in ‘glocal’ or translocal ways (Brewer, 2010; Conway, 2008; Merry, 2006; Mazlish, 2005). That is to say, the global and the local intertwine in interesting and complicated ways. As the ‘local’ engages with international discourses, institutions and actors, transitional justice takes on different dimensions and produces unexpected outcomes. A number of studies have explored how global ideas get grounded or ‘domesticated’ in specific ‘local’ contexts (Conway, 2008; Merry, 2006; Goodale, 2007). According to Merry (2006:38-39), local intermediaries play a crucial role. Merry suggests that as ideas from trans-national sources travel to communities they are typically vernacularized, or adapted to local institutions and meanings. Goodale (2007:30) raises an important caveat which has a bearing upon this article. He makes a distinction ‘between vernacularization where meaningful translation is occurring, and where local political actors overlay other distinctive political projects with the legitimizing mantle of rights, but to which they may have only a fleeting and expedient commitment’. 

The Paradoxes of Transitional Justice 
Numerous commentators have argued that transitional justice can be used by elites for a variety of purposes and to serve or conceal other very different political agendas. These commentators contend that transitional justice discourse may be co-opted by governments for their instrumental political value (Hamber, 2003), to manage or obfuscate ‘the truth’ (Rolston and Scraton, 2005), as window dressing (Stanley, 2008), to validate hegemonic narratives (Hegarty, 2003), legitimise tarnished institutions (Wilson, 2001); and, as Subotic (2009) claims, gain the approval of prestigious international organisations, pre-empt genuine justice processes and shield impunity. The thrust of these arguments is that political agendas have been placed ahead of providing for the ‘basics’ of transitional justice – to establish the ‘truth’ and so on. Thus, transitional justice concepts and mechanisms may be simultaneously enabling and constraining (Theidon, 2009:297).
 
There is more than echo here of debates concerning the role and purpose of public inquiries in Ireland and the UK (Rolston and Scraton, 2005; Hegarty 2003; Gilligan and Pratt, 2004). Sceptics argue that public inquiries are convenient mechanisms in the construction of official memory and a veneer of democratic process (Rolston and Scraton, 2005). Yet, it has also been argued that public inquiries can escape their origins, be effective information gatherers, reach unexpected conclusions and hold powerful institutions and governments to account (Brown, 2004:26-45). I would suggest that this at least holds out the possibility that it remains possible to hold powerful interests to account and to influence outcomes from ‘the bottom-up’. The recently published Saville Report into the killing of thirteen civilians by the British Army Parachute Regiment in Derry during a civil rights march in 1972 appears to have surprised many in Northern Ireland and beyond by its unequivocal acknowledgement of innocence and almost unprecedented finding of guilt. As one critic of public inquiries reflected,   ‘the importance of the report should not be underestimated’, and while acknowledging its shortcomings, he concluded, ‘this is as good as it ever gets’ (Rolston, 2010).


The Northern Ireland Context:  Internal Challenges and External Influences

In Northern Ireland, over 3, 500 people have been killed, and there were widespread and systematic violations of human rights by state and non-state actors and allegations of collusion between state agencies and Loyalist paramilitaries. The Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998, signalled the end of over 30 years of armed conflict. Not only was the idea of a comprehensive ‘truth’ recovery mechanism absent from the multi-party talks leading up to the Agreement, avoiding talk of the dealing with past was the defining leitmotif of the Irish peace progress more generally. In the intervening years the ‘victims’ agenda and the ‘truth’ and justice debate became one of the most contentious issues and key ‘sites of struggle’ within civil society and wider political arena. That is to say, the meta-conflict – a conflict about the conflict – was played out.  The HET is a ‘truth’ recovery process which is part of a package of measures designed to find ways to deal with the difficulties of addressing a contested past. It was set up in 2005 and was formally launched in January 2006. It is a ‘separate’ unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The key stated objectives are ‘to build public confidence in the wider PSNI’, ‘to answer as far as possible the unresolved questions of victims’ and provide a ‘measure of resolution’ to those families (Lundy, 2009a). The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) allocated the project £34 million over a six year period until 2010/11. It is envisaged that there will be further funding until 2013, exceeding the original timescale by two to three years (and perhaps beyond). The task of reviewing over 3,000 cases, of which 2,002 were never solved, spanning three decades is irrefutably a massive endeavour. However, the scale of conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland is less severe than that experienced in other conflicts. This means that unlike many other transitional societies it is feasible to review all conflict-related cases. 

Internal Challenges 
Dealing with the past in conflicted societies presents huge problems. The next two sections examine how Northern Ireland has responded to the inherent dilemmas of memory work in a divided society. It considers at least five local challenges, and the interplay of external influences, which create pressures and opportunities for the state and society. First, civil society, in collaboration with international NGOs and actors, initiated a plethora of ‘bottom-up’ ‘truth’ recovery projects, campaigns and measures that consciously, or not, adopted global transitional justice discourses and processes (Bell, 2003; HTR, 2006a; Kelly, 2005). At the same time, the use of international legal mechanisms by victims, NGOs and legal representatives were adopted to seek legal redress in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR Judgements, 2001). Taken together, such processes constitute a substantive civil society response to the imperatives of ‘post-conflict’ ‘truth’ recovery. Second, and importantly, the proliferation of initiatives ‘from below’ was used as a ‘tool’ to apply pressure on the authorities to address the legacy of historic cases and to campaign for further public inquiries. In Northern Ireland, there is fierce opposition to public inquiries on the grounds of cost and their state-centricity (Campbell and Turner, 2008:382-384). Certainly the strongest criticisms have come from within the Unionist community and former members of the security forces and their families who believe they have been the brunt of investigations into the past; and feel let down by a government that does not appreciate the sacrifices they have made holding the line during the conflict (Lundy, 2010:126). I would suggest that, the demand, and potential, for further public inquiries is a significant factor in the motivation and rationale for the HET. It is clear from internal HET documents, that the demands for further public inquiries was categorised as high risk and therefore to be averted (HET, Risk Registers, 2006-2008). As Hugh Orde (2009:7) has stated, ‘the economic arguments for the HET are very powerful, compared to the incredibly expensive legal public inquiry approach, which does not represent very good value for money in my terms’. Third, equally contentious is the demands on the PSNI to service historic investigations that are said to divert scarce resources and compromises ability to effectively police the present (NIAC, 2008; Orde, 2009:3). Fourth, policing was high on the political agenda, and for a time, perceived lack of progress appeared to threaten and destabilise the devolved administration and powering-sharing executive. The nature of the Northern Ireland State has been contested and the perceived role of the police in buttressing it created a legitimacy crisis for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), renamed PSNI. The RUC has been the focus of allegations of human rights abuses and collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups during the conflict. Lack of trust and acceptance of the police has therefore been greatest among the Catholic/ Nationalist community. Sinn Fein did not agree to join the Northern Ireland Policing Board until January 2007 (the Policing Board was established in 2001); the inability of the police to face up to its past was undoubtedly a contributing factor in the stalemate. It was therefore an imperative that the police and the state were actively seen to be addressing the legacy of historic conflict-related deaths and victims demands for information. From a pragmatic point of view, as Hugh Orde (2009: 3) noted, ‘if we didn’t face up to the challenge, we would continually be revisiting old cases… this would lead to the resurfacing of old accusations and old suspicions, and detract from the reforms made in policing’ He concluded, ‘a refusal to act could do more damage than any possible political instability created by opening up old cases’ (Orde, 2009:5).  The controversial nature of policing and historic lack of trust within sections of the community presented the state and PSNI with particular challenges in building public confidence in a police led ‘truth’ recovery process. In response, an effort was made to address the thorny issue of independence. The HET report directly to the Chief Constable, and a team of retired officers from police forces outside Northern Ireland was employed to work alongside retired policed officers from Northern Ireland. This indicated an apparent willingness to find a model that would meet the needs of communities and contribute to confronting the past from a police perspective. That, and the promise of ‘maximum permissible disclosure’, was enough for a number of NGOs working within Nationalist communities, but not exclusively, to tactically engage in the HET process and some families followed. In many ways this was a significant breakthrough for the PSNI. 
The issue of independence must also be understood in the context of external influences and the British state’s obligations arising from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (as discussed shortly). In reality, the HET is structurally intertwined with PSNI, and former RUC, this has led to criticism of staffing arrangements, the role of gatekeepers, influence of ‘RUC corporate memory’ and ‘cross-contamination’ of organisational linkages (Lundy, 2009a).  From its inception HET independence has been controversial and it has not managed to gain cross-community support. One of the largest NGOs representing mostly victims of State violence in Northern Ireland, Relatives for Justice (RFJ), has consistently refused to engage in the process. The issue of independence is likely to be further challenged in view of the new Chief Constable’s announcement of a policy ‘shift’ that all HET cases which have evidential opportunities, and/or potential of arrests, or prosecution, will be completely transferred to ‘mainstream’ PSNI (that is Crime Operations, C2). NGOs and others are likely to raise concerns about how the PSNI can justify investigating sensitive issues that may touch upon the police themselves.This begs the question, why the change in policy?​[3]​ Fifth, a dilemma for states emerging out of conflict is how to deal with the problem of divided memories in ways that do not simply reproduce and/or reinforce further division. This is particularly pertinent in Northern Ireland where there is a differentiation of views between the two main communities on the desirability of a ‘truth’ recovery process. Generally speaking, the Protestant/Unionist community is suspicious of ‘truth’ recovery and perceive it as part of a ‘republican agenda’ or ‘Trojan Horse’ and a way to ‘bash the state’ and discredit the past actions of the security forces (Lundy and McGovern, 2008b; Lundy, 2010: 125-126). The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC, 2009)​[4]​ concluded that there is insufficient ‘cross-community consensus’ at present for a proposal by the Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) for a Legacy Commission.​[5]​ 






During the mid-1990s a globalizing transitional justice discourse influence is manifest in a number of ways in Northern Ireland. Apart from the examples already given above, as far back as 1993, it included a considerable volume of international visitors with expertise in transitional justice in other societies such as Frank La Rue (Guatemala), Alex Boraine (South Africa), Pracillia Hayer, Paul Seils (Guatemala), RMHI Project staff (Guatemala) just to mention a few. Importantly this resulted in the development of networks and collaboration; there were reciprocal visits to transitional societies and scores of international seminars and conferences held in Northern Ireland during the late 1990s and earlier 2000s on ‘truth’ recovery and other aspects of transitional justice. Brian Conway (2008:197) notes the impact of such global influences during the mid-1990s on the Bloody Sunday campaign which occasioned a shift towards a ‘truth-telling’, human rights and justice story-line.  

An external factor of considerable influence is that the UK government has also certain commitments and obligations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its implementation domestically through the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK government has been found in breach of Article 2, the right to life, in a number of cases in Northern Ireland. In 2002, in response, the UK Government presented the ECHR with a ‘package of measures’, to address the issues raised by the ECHR. A key component of the ‘package of measures’ was the Serious Crimes Review Team (now Historical Enquires Team). As I have argued elsewhere, the ECHR cases have been a key ‘driver’ in the motivation for setting up the HET (Lundy, 2009a:133-138). The ECHR Article-2 judgements also set the benchmarks for an acceptable past-focused retrospective process. The standards and principles that the British Government is obliged to comply with include – independence, promptness, accessibility to the family, and sufficient public scrutiny. In addition, and, as already discussed, transitional justice has come to dominate debates on ‘truth’ recovery mechanism. In many ways transitional justice has provided an internationally recognised formula and yardstick for judging governments’ response to victims’ needs and accountability after conflict. These internal pressures and external influences combined help explain the increasing pragmatic use of transitional justice discourse by the Northern Ireland State and official institutions which emerged in the mid-2000s. 

The influence of a global transitional justice discourse is evident in the statements and activities of key officials as mentioned above. The adaptation of the discourse by the PSNI is evident in Hugh Orde’s lecture at Church House, Westminster in 2009. In this lecture he recounted the motivation and rationale of the HET; he quoted extensively from the leading transitional justice scholar Louis Bickford on the ‘two overlapping paradigms for confronting past memory and transitional justice’ and ‘creating a ‘never again’ mentality’. ‘As it turned out’, he said, ‘the HET set up by the PSNI was to be the first major new societal step towards addressing these issues.’ In an effort to explicitly link the HET with other efforts of dealing with the past in different parts of globe, he referred to the Balkans, Colombia, Uganda, Rwanda and South Africa (2009:1-3).This appears to be an attempt to link the PSNI/HET, and reinforce the parallels, with international transitional justice and ‘truth’ recovery efforts. While the HET is bold, imaginative and innovative in the world of policing and in transitional justice terms and it should be assessed in the context of the challenges facing a society struggling to find ways to deal with a conflicted past. It is also important to carefully scrutinise what the HET may conceal, as well as what it may, or may not deliver in terms of ‘truth’ (Lundy, 2009a, 2010). 

The Historical Enquiries Team

Notwithstanding the unlikely scenario of designing the ‘perfect’ process, a fundamental and valid question is, does the HET have the capacity to hold the state, and non-state actors, to account and restore victims’ dignity through ‘justice’, ‘truth’ and acknowledgement? The aim of this section is to look in turn at what the HET has accomplished in relation to each of the following separately: ‘justice’, ‘truth’, acknowledgement and accountability. These are ‘basic’ transitional justice principles and claimed benefits of ‘truth’ recovery generally. Transitional justice discourse and concepts are clearly employed by the PSNI (Orde, 2009); and ‘truth’ recovery discourse is an indispensable part of the HET lexicon (Lundy, 2009a: 161-162). What follows is an exploration of what appears to be a disjuncture between transitional justice claims ‘from above’ and experiences from ‘below’. 
The question of ‘justice’ is highly emotive and achieving it presents overwhelming challenges for societies in transition. It often raises dilemmas about the acceptability of some form of amnesty and the likely unpalatable trade-offs (Lundy, 2010:116-118). The HET has stated that prosecutions are likely in a very small number of cases, if at all. Various other sources have cast doubt on the viability of prosecutions; indicating that witnesses are likely to be old or dead, exhibits where they exist could be contaminated and would not meet current evidential standards, paperwork may be incomplete, missing or destroyed and there have been ineffective investigations in some cases (HTR, 2006b; Lundy, 2009a:129-131; 2010:119). If ‘justice’ is measured narrowly, and in terms of prosecutions, the HET has had limited success. Most of the arrests and reports to the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) have actually emanated form the Police Ombudsman’s Operation Ballast Report into collusion and misuse of informants.​[6]​ Since HET took on the case files two years ago, its investigations have led to 20 people being either charged or reported to the PPS for a total of 23 offences including murder and attempted murder. One other case involving the death of a fifteen year old by a British solider in 1972 was forwarded to the PPS but no prosecution followed on the grounds of ‘public interest’. This family were initially highly and publicly critical of the HET review and the final report. With the assistance of a local lawyer, the family raised the case with the Lord Chief Justice, in October 2009 the Coroner decided to reopen an inquest into the death. This indicates that HET reports can have a knock on effect if families are persistent and determined to seek avenues to ‘justice’. 
From a pragmatic conflict transformation perspective, it might be considered politically expedient that prosecutions do not occur which might destabilise the peace process. A senior loyalist, William (Plum) Smith, recently strongly criticised historic investigations. He claimed that an unwritten ‘amnesty’ (for state and non-state actors) was part of the Good Friday Agreement and that ‘the PSNI and Historical Enquiries Team are breaking the deal in continuing investigations into the past’. As a result, he argued, ‘there are fears that continuing investigations and pursuit of prosecutions into events that predate that agreement could destabilise the loyalist community’. This prompted another leading loyalist, Jackie McDonald, to say, ‘we need to draw a line in the past’ (Belfast Telegraph, March 22, 2010; Brewer, 2010:169-171 discusses some of the problems Loyalists have with truth recovery; Lundy & McGovern, 2008b). This opens up a whole range of dilemmas and challenges for the state that go to the heart of transitional justice and how to deal with the past (Lundy, 2010). 
However, ‘justice’ can be defined and understood in alternative ways. According to transitional justice principles alternative forms of ‘justice’ to fulfil victims’ needs include ‘truth’ recovery processes. Many families accept that prosecutions are unlikely; what they want is the ‘truth’ and acknowledgement. The benefits attributed to transitional justice, and an official ‘truth’ recovery process, include their ability to help victims and establish an authoritative record of the past. The HET in many respects is an alternative way, that is, it is tasked with answering families’ unresolved questions wherever possible. In significant ways the HET departs from traditional policing with regards to the type of questions it receives; they range from allegations of collusion, to requests for the minutia of detail about the incident – who was with their loved one when they died, was a priest or minister present, what were their last words, can I have the clothes back s/he wore that day, did they suffer and so on. While some victims’ know very little about the circumstances of the death of their loved one, others have carried out their own research and collected information over the years. These families have accumulated considerable knowledge about the event, often with the help of NGO and/or community processes. Such ‘bottom-up’ initiatives can help raise awareness and are useful for campaigning purposes but they lack official standing. What families often seek is the ‘truth’ to be recognised by means of an ‘official stamp’. In this regard some victims families are satisfied with HET reports. Here is how one individual put it,
Yes, it was worth going through with it. Because it has answered all them questions that I had, that was eating away at me for years and I had nowhere to go with them…. I have a record for my family in years to come of what happened… official acknowledgement. And there’s no doubt, absolutely no doubt that my family were totally innocent. So that’s something I have (Interview with family member of victim, July 28, 2008).
Other victims’ families expressed the view that the HET review had not provided acknowledgement and did not answer their questions. 
It’s mechanical, clinical exercise… they’ve done the paper, forensic trail etc but they’ve couched everything they have said in very careful language… It’s more or less regurgitating what we told them. So no there’s nothing we didn’t already know. So it hasn’t furthered our quest for the ‘truth’ (Interview with family member of victim, July 13, 2010).
Even though their questions were not answered, some families still thought it was worth doing.
It’s a desk top exercise. It’s good because it puts things chronologically; but I could have done that myself. But it has not answered my questions. Factually information has been useful but that is as far as it went (Interview with family member of victim, June, 10, 2010).    
Transitional justice advocates claim that by acknowledging suffering and wrongdoing and allowing victims to tell their story it will help restore dignity and assist the healing process. Stanley (2005: 583) makes the point that the healing function is dependent upon recognition. The HET describes itself as family focused and its credibility rests on its ability to provide families with answers to their questions. The process has however been criticised for the ways in which the process impedes or delimits the recovery of ‘truth’ (Lundy, 2009a: 155-162).  In particular, at the time of the research, the importance of framing questions the ‘right way’ was identified as significantly impacting on the quality of reports and answers provided. Some families did not fully understand that the process hinged on asking the ‘right question’. Moreover, it does not augur well in terms of the promise of ‘maximum disclosure’ that the former Chief Constable initiated legal proceedings against the Coroner’s access to the police investigation into controversial shooting in 1992 (McCaffrey, 2008:13). In May 2010, his replacement Chief Constable Matt Baggott initiated a judicial review challenging the power of the Coroner and related to public interest immunity applications for the Stalker and Sampson reports in nine legacy cases (CC v Coroner, 27.5.10).
 
Accountability is a key principle of transitional justice. The rationale for seeking to establish an authoritative record is to reveal the extent and nature of violations and establish responsibility. This will in turn inform the population about the events of the past and challenge denial. While it is difficult to trace certain activities via a paper trail given the clandestine nature of much of the activities of paramilitary groups and various agents involved in counterinsurgency violence; one might expect that in a Western liberal democracy the actions of the state in suspected unlawful killings should be open to scrutiny. From the state’s perspective tracing ‘persons of interest’ after more than three decades presents considerable logistical problems, and, importantly, as touched upon above, it raises a number of dilemmas in the context of post-conflict transition. Over a period of more than two and a half years the HET were unable to trace British soldiers through Ministry of Defence (MOD) channels; at the time of the research, tracing efforts resulted in only one positive identification and contact (Lundy, 2009a: 151-155). While direct responsibility rests with the MoD, the inability of the HET to identify, engage and interview security force personnel cast doubt on its capacity to fulfil its objectives. The tracing issue was compounded in 2007 when NGOs challenged the HET about cases processed under what is known as the ‘Tea and Sandwiches Agreement’.​[7]​ This resulted in over 150 cases being ‘recalled’ by the HET and/or reconsidered (Lundy, 2009a, 151-155; 2010: 128-129). Importantly, as a result of criticism, and pressure from NGOs, the HET has introduced a new tracing system. A number of army ‘persons of interest’ have been identified, traced and interviewed. These interviews appear to be dependent upon voluntary cooperation and are therefore not conducted under caution. The HET does not have the power to subpoena and arrest unless there is a fresh evidential opportunity identified.  In these circumstances, which are compounded by the ‘reality’ of inherited empty files; a voluntary process could be viewed as ‘creative’ and highly unusual in the world of traditional policing. Significantly, it opens up a ‘space’ and possibility in seeking answers to families’ unresolved questions in cases where prosecution appear unlikely. A number of the ‘recalled’ cases have now been re-examined and there is a positive response from some families and NGOs (see, William McGreanery, 2010 and other cases available at http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/). It is too early to say whether there will be voluntary co-operation and a positive outcome in the remainder of the ‘recalled’ cases. This example illustrates the important role of NGOs in challenging and pushing the boundaries ‘from below’. Research has shown that the HET process and the quality and depth of HET reports improved when NGOs or other representatives with experience in casework assisted families (Lundy, 2009a).  It also shows that the HET listened and took steps to improve the process and created an alternative route to ‘overcome’ the challenge of getting answers to unresolved questions.  This approach may satisfy the needs of some victims’ families’ but it is likely to be unpalatable to others. Such ‘informal’ processes are likely to attract criticism, particularly from the legal profession and sections of the human rights ‘community’ that would, amongst other things, seek to question or challenge versions of events. The highly legalised approach to the past has however come under scrutiny and critique (McEvoy, 2007). This again signifies the contested nature of dealing with the legacy of the past and transitional justice generally.
The remit of the HET is to review individual cases. That is to say, it focuses on micro-‘truths’ and does not address the macro or ‘bigger picture issues. This section of the article considers why micro ‘truth’ is so important to the HET/ PSNI; and why the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) considers it necessary to fund it. It could be argued that individualising cases has a number of drawbacks not least that it avoids a systematic analysis of how and why things happened the way they did. Here is how one individual put it:
To give an example, there is a series of cases in Belfast where the allegation is that people were killed by Military Reconnaissance Force in drive by shooting… this was undercover army units. It is no good in those cases to be looking at an individual case because you just discover that Johnny died… But if you don’t look at it from above you might not be able to understand and get a sense that there were widespread, credible allegations that this was actually a policy. (Interview with NGO representative, December, 2007)
Individualising cases or micro analysis avoids institutional responsibility. Priscilla Hayer points out that macro analysis carried out by truth commissions means ‘there is generally no other body in a position to review the record of and deficiencies of the judicial system, for example. Indeed, the following quote echoes these sentiments,
The other problem with the [HET] remit is… how do you look at actions or inactions of the Director of Public Prosecutions? Again, if you deal with things on a case by case basis, how do you understand why the DPP refused to prosecute soldiers and police? How do you understand NIO actions or MoD actions and how much that fuelled the conflict? How does that fit into the investigation of an individual case? (Interview with NGO representative, December, 2007).
I would argue that the HET does not have the capacity to deal comprehensively with such thematic issues or macro-analysis (Lundy, 2010:128-130). Neither did its architects have this in mind.
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^1	  In 2004 Kofi Annan defined transitional justice as comprising the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. Central elements of this ‘formula’ include prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform and vetting, or a combination thereof. 
^2	  The ‘package of measures’ include establishment of the Police Ombudsman’s Office; “calling in” of other police forces to investigate deaths; the establishment of the Serious Crime Review Team [now Historical Enquiries Team]; the option for families to judicial review of decisions not to prosecute; new practices relating to verdicts of coroner’s juries at inquests & disclosure at inquests; measures following reviews of the coroners’ system; legal aid requests; and the Inquiries Act.
^3	  According to a number of sources interviewed, the explanation given by the PSNI was that a series of complex cases (Operation Ballast) required further resources and the HET did not have the skills required; complex investigations would be better placed within C2.  
^4	  The Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee is a select committee of the House of Commons in the Parliament of the UK. The NIAC has been criticized by some as being a ‘cold house’ for those who do not share a particular Unionist perspective on the past. 
^5	  In January 2009 the British government appointed a Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) to consult widely and recommend how best Northern Ireland could deal with its past. The core recommendation was the establishment of a Legacy Commission or truth commission.
^6	  Police Ombudsman Public Statement and Report on Operation Ballast – RUC/PSNI Collusion with the UVF in North Belfast, 2007 available at http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/collusion/ballast.html.
^7	  This refers to cases involving army personnel suspected of being involved in unlawful killings of civilians not being interviewed at the time by the police but instead it was agreed that this should be undertaken by the Royal Military Police (RMP). This resulted in some 157 RMP cases being ‘recalled’ by the HET and/or reconsidered
